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Abstract
Voting systems typically treat all voters equally. We argue that perhaps they should not: Voters who
have supported good choices in the past should be given higher weight than voters who have supported
bad ones. To develop a formal framework for desirable weighting schemes, we draw on no-regret learn-
ing. Specifically, given a voting rule, we wish to design a weighting scheme such that applying the voting
rule, with voters weighted by the scheme, leads to choices that are almost as good as those endorsed by
the best voter in hindsight. We derive possibility and impossibility results for the existence of such
weighting schemes, depending on whether the voting rule and the weighting scheme are deterministic or
randomized, as well as on the social choice axioms satisfied by the voting rule.
1 Introduction
In most elections, voters are entitled to equal voting power. This principle underlies the one person, one vote
doctrine, and is enshrined in the United States Supreme Court ruling in the Reynolds v. Sims (1964) case.
But there are numerous voting systems in which voters do, in fact, have different weights. Standard
examples include the European Council, where (for certain decisions) the weight of each member country is
proportional to its population; and corporate voting procedures where stockholders have one vote per share.
Some historical voting systems are even more pertinent: Sweden’s 1866 system weighted voters by wealth,
giving especially wealthy voters as many as 5000 votes; and a Belgian system, used for a decade at the end
of the 19th Century, gave (at least) one vote to each man, (at least) two votes to each educated man, and
three votes to men who were both educated and wealthy Congleton [2011].
The last two examples can be seen as (silly, from a modern viewpoint) attempts to weight voters bymerit,
using wealth and education as measurable proxies thereof. We believe that the basic idea of weighting voters
by merit does itself have merit. But we propose to measure a voter’s merit by the quality of his past votes.
That is, a voter who has supported good choices in the past should be given higher weight than a voter who
has supported bad ones.
This high-level scheme is, arguably, most applicable to repeated aggregation of objective opinions. For
example, consider a group of engineers trying to decide which prototype to develop, based on an objective
measure of success such as projected market share. If an engineer supported a certain prototype and it
turned out to be a success, she should be given higher weight compared to her peers in future decisions; if it
is a failure, her weight should lower. Similar examples include a group of investors selecting companies to
invest in; and a group of decision makers in a movie studio choosing movie scripts to produce. Importantly,
the recently launched, not-for-profit website RoboVote.org already provides public access to voting tools for
precisely these situations, albeit using methods that always treat all voters equally Procaccia et al. [2016].
Our goal in this paper, therefore, is to augment existing voting methods with weights, in a way that keeps
track of voters’ past performance, and guarantees good choices over time. The main conceptual problem we
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face is the development of a formal framework in which one can reason about desirable weighting schemes;
in three words, our solution is no-regret learning.
1.1 Our Approach
The most basic no-regret learning model involves a set of n experts. In each round t = 1, . . . , T , the
algorithm chooses an expert at random, with probability proportional to their current weights. Then the
loss of each expert i at round t is revealed, and the algorithm incurs the expected loss corresponding to
its randomized choice. The overall loss (across T rounds) of the algorithm, and of each expert, is defined
by summing up the per-round losses. The algorithm’s goal is to incur an overall loss that is comparable
to the best expert in hindsight. Specifically, under a no-regret learning algorithm, the average (per-round)
difference between the algorithm’s loss and the loss of the best expert goes to 0 as T goes to infinity.
We depart from the classic setting in several ways — some superficial, and some fundamental. Instead
of experts, we have a set of n voters. In each round, each voter reveals a ranking over a set of alternatives,1
and the loss of each alternative is revealed. In addition, we are given a (possibly randomized) voting rule,
which receives weighted rankings as input, and outputs the winning alternative. The voting rule is not part
of our design space; it is exogenous and fixed throughout the process. The loss of a voter in round t is
given by assigning his ranking all the weight (equivalently, imagining that all voters have that ranking),
applying the voting rule, and measuring the loss of the winning alternative (or the expected loss, if the rule
is randomized). As in the classic setting, our benchmark is the best voter in hindsight.
At first glance, it may seem that our setting easily reduces to the classic one, by treating voters as experts.
But our loss is computed by applying the given voting rule to the entire profile of weighted rankings, and
therein lies the rub. To develop some intuition, consider the case of two alternatives a and b, and the
weighted majority rule, which selects a if the total weight of voters who rank a above b is greater than 1/2,
and b otherwise. Suppose that at round t, the loss of a is 0, the loss of b is 1, and the vote profile and
weighting scheme are such that voters ranking a above b have a total weight of 1/2 + ǫ. Consequently, the
rule selects a, and our loss at round t is exactly 0. But if we perturbed the weights slightly, b would be
selected, and our loss would jump to 1. By contrast, in the classic setting the algorithm’s loss is obviously
continuous in the weights assigned to experts.
An obvious question at this point is whether there is a weighting scheme that would allow us to compete
with the best voter in hindsight, under the weighted majority rule. Our main research question is much more
general:
For which voting rules is there a weighting scheme such that the difference between our average
per-round loss and that of the best voter goes to zero as the number of rounds goes to infinity?
Ironically, the very formulation of this technical question gives a first answer to our original conceptual
question: A desirable weighting scheme, with respect to a given voting rule, is one that gives no-regret
guarantees.
1.2 Our Results
Analogously to the learning literature, we consider two settings that differ in the type of feedback we receive
in each time step, which we can use to adjust the voters’ weights. In the full information setting, we
are informed of the loss of each alternative. This would be the case, for example, if the alternatives are
companies to invest in. By contrast, in the partial information setting, we are only privy to the loss of the
selected alternative. This type of feedback is appropriate when the alternatives are product prototypes: we
1The alternatives can change across rounds, and even their number may vary.
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cannot know how successful an undeveloped prototype would have been, but obviously we can measure the
success of a prototype that was selected for development.
In Section 4, we devise no-regret weighting schemes for both settings, and for any voting rule. Specif-
ically, in the full information setting, we show that for any voting rule there is a weighting scheme with
regret O(
√
T ln(n)); in the partial information setting, the regret guarantee is O(
√
Tn ln(n)). While these
results make no assumptions on the voting rule, they also impose no restrictions on the weighting scheme.
In particular, the foregoing weighting schemes heavily rely on randomization, that is, they are allowed to
sample a weight vector from a distribution in each time step.
However, deterministic weighting schemes seem more desirable, as they are easier to interpret and
explain: a voter’s weight depends only on past performance, and not on random decisions made by the
scheme. In Section 5, therefore, we restrict our attention to deterministic weighting schemes. We find that
if the voting rule is itself deterministic, it admits a no-regret weighting scheme if and only if it is constant
on unanimous profiles. Because this property is not satisfied by any reasonable rule, the theorem should
be interpreted as a strong impossibility result. We next consider randomized voting rules, and find that
they give rise to much more subtle results, which depend on the properties of the voting rule in question.
Specifically, we show that if the voting rule is a distribution over unilaterals — a property satisfied by
randomized positional scoring rules — then it admits a deterministic no-regret weighting scheme. By
contrast, if the voting rule satisfies a probabilistic version of the famous Condorcet consistency axiom, then
no-regret guarantees are impossible to achieve through a deterministic weighting scheme.
1.3 Related Work
Blum and Mansour [2007] provide an excellent overview of basic models and results in no-regret learning;
throughout the paper we rely on some important technical results in this space Freund and Schapire [1995],
Auer et al. [2002]. Conceptually, our work is superficially related to papers on online ranking, where the
algorithm chooses a ranking of objects at each stage. These papers differ from each other in how the loss
function is defined, and the type of feedback used. For example, in the model of Radlinski et al. [2008], the
loss is 0 if among the top k objects in the ranking there is at least one that is “relevant”, and 1 otherwise.
Chaudhuri and Tewari [2015] assume there is a relevance score for each object, and the loss of a ranking
is calculated through one of several common measures; the twist is that the algorithm only observes the
relevance of the top-ranked object, which is insufficient to even compute the loss of the ranking that it chose
(i.e., it is incomparable to bandit feedback). Our setting is quite different, of course: While voters have
rankings, our loss is determined by aggregating these rankings via a voting rule. And instead of outputting
a ranking over alternatives, our algorithm can only output weights over voters.
We also draw connections to the computational social choice Brandt et al. [2016] literature through-
out the paper Gibbard [1977], Conitzer and Sandholm [2006], Procaccia [2010], Moulin [1983]. For now
let us just point to a few papers that share some of the features of our problem. Specifically, there is a
significant body of work on weighted voting, in the context of manipulation, control, and bribery in elec-
tions Conitzer et al. [2007], Zuckerman et al. [2009], Faliszewski et al. [2009, 2015]. And there are papers
that study repeated (or dynamic) voting Boutilier and Procaccia [2012], Parkes and Procaccia [2013], albeit
in settings where the preferences of voters evolve over time.
2 Preliminaries
Our work draws on social choice theory and online learning. In this section we present important concepts
and results from each of these areas in turn.
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2.1 Social Choice
We consider a set [n] , {1, . . . , n} of voters and a set A ofm alternatives. A vote σ : A→ [m] is a linear
ordering — a ranking or permutation — of the alternatives. That is, for any vote σ and alternative a, σ(a)
denotes the position of alternative a in vote σ. For any a, b ∈ A, σ(a) < σ(b) indicates that alternative a is
preferred to b under vote σ. We also denote this preference by a ≻σ b. We denote the set of all m! possible
votes over A by L(A).
A vote profile σ ∈ L(A)n denotes the votes of n voters. Furthermore, given a vote profile σ ∈ L(A)n
and a weight vector w ∈ Rn≥0, we define the anonymous vote profile corresponding to σ and w, denoted
π ∈ [0, 1]|L(A)|, by setting
πσ ,
1
‖w‖1
n∑
i=1
wi1(σi=σ), ∀σ ∈ L(A).
That is, π is an |L(A)|-dimensional vector such that for each vote σ ∈ L(A), πσ is the fraction of the
total weight on σ. When needed, we use πσ,w to clarify the vote profile and weight vector to which the
anonymous vote profile corresponds to. Note that πσ,w only contains the anonymized information about σ
and w, i.e., the anonymous vote profile remains the same even when the identities of the voters change.
To aggregate the (weighted) votes into a distribution over alternatives, we next introduce the concept
of (anonymous) voting rules. Let ∆(L(A)) be the set of all possible anonymous vote profiles. Similarly,
let ∆(A) denote the set of all possible distributions over A. An anonymous voting rule is a function f :
∆(L(A)) → ∆(A) that takes as input an anonymous vote profile π and returns a distribution over the
alternatives indicated by a vector f(π), where f(π)a is the probability that alternative a is the winner under
π. We say that a voting rule f is deterministic if for any π ∈ ∆(L(A)), f(π) has support of size 1, i.e.,
there is a unique winner.
One class of anonymous voting rules use the positions of the individual alternatives in order to determine
the winners. These rules, collectively called positional scoring rules, are defined by a scoring vector s such
that s1 ≥ s2 ≥ · · · ≥ sm ≥ 0. Given a vote σ, the score of alternative a ∈ A in σ is the score of its position
in σ, i.e., sσ(a). Given an anonymous vote profile π, the score of an alternative is its overall score in the
rankings of π, that is,
s-scorepi(a) ,
∑
σ∈L(A)
πσsσ(a).
A deterministic positional scoring rule chooses the alternative with the highest score, i.e., f(π) = ea∗ ,
where a∗ ∈ argmaxa∈A s-scorepi(a) (tie breaking may be needed). On the other hand, a randomized
positional scoring rule chooses each alternative with probability proportional to its score, i.e., f(π)a ∝
s-scorepi(a) for all a ∈ A. Examples of positional scoring rules include plurality with s = (1, 0, . . . , 0),
veto with s = (1, . . . , 1, 0), and Borda with s = (m− 1,m− 2, . . . , 0).
Another class of anonymous voting rules use pairwise comparisons between the alternatives to determine
the winners. We are especially interested in the Copeland rule, which assigns a score to each alternative
based on the number of pairwise majority contests it wins. In an anonymous vote profile π, we denote
by a>pi b the event that a beats b in a pairwise competition, i.e., a is preferred to b in rankings in π that
collectively have more than half the weight. More formally,
∑
σ∈L(A) πσ1(a≻σb) > 1/2. We also write
a =pi b if they are tied, i.e.,
∑
σ∈L(A) πσ1(a≻σb) = 1/2. The Copeland score
2 of an alternative is defined by
C-scorepi(a) , |{b ∈ A | a>pi b}|+ 1
2
· |{b ∈ A | a =pi b}| .
2Some refer to this variant of Copeland as Copeland1/2 Faliszewski et al. [2008].
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The deterministic Copeland rule chooses the alternative that has the highest Copeland score (possibly break-
ing ties), and the randomized Copeland rule chooses each alternative with probability proportional to its
Copeland score.
The deterministic Copeland rule satisfies a classic social choice axiom, which we present next. We say
that a ∈ A is a Condorcet winner in the vote profile π if a>pi b for all b ∈ A \ {a}. A voting rule is
Condorcet consistent if it selects a Condorcet winner whenever one exists in the given vote profile. Note
that the Copeland score of a Condorcet winner ism−1, whereas the Copeland score of any other alternative
must be strictly smaller, so a Condorcet winner (if one exists) indeed has maximum Copeland score.
An anonymous deterministic voting rule f is called strategyproof if for any voter i ∈ [n], any two vote
profiles σ and σ′ for which σj = σ
′
j for all j 6= i, and any weight vector w, it holds that either a = a′
or a ≻σi a′, where a and a′ are the winning alternatives in f(πσ,w) and f(πσ′,w) respectively. In words,
whenever a voter reports σ′i instead of σi, the outcome does not improve according to the true ranking
σi. While strategyproofness is a natural property to be desired in a voting rule, the celebrated Gibbard-
Satterthwaite Theorem Gibbard [1973], Satterthwaite [1975] shows that non-dictatorial strategyproof deter-
ministic voting rules do not exist.3 Subsequently, Gibbard [1977] extended this result to randomized voting
rules. Before presenting his extension, we introduce some additional definitions.
Given a loss function over the alternatives denoted by a vector ℓ ∈ [0, 1]m, the expected loss of the
alternative chosen by the rule f under an anonymous vote profile π is
Lf (π, ℓ) , Ea∼f(pi)[ℓa] = f(π) · ℓ.
The higher the loss, the worse the alternative. We say that the loss function ℓ is consistent with vote σ ∈
L(A) if for all a, b ∈ A, a ≻σ b ⇔ ℓa < ℓb. An anonymous randomized rule f is strategyproof if for any
voter i ∈ [n], any two vote profiles σ and σ′ for which σj = σ′j for all j 6= i, any weight vector w, and any
loss function ℓ that is consistent with σi, we have Lf (πσ,w, ℓ) ≤ Lf (πσ′,w, ℓ).
The next proposition is an interpretation of a result of Gibbard [1977] on the structural property shared
by all strategyproof randomized voting rules, applied to anonymous voting rules.
Proposition 2.1. Any strategyproof randomized rule is a distribution over a collection of the following types
of rules:
1. Anonymous Unilaterals: g is an anonymous unilateral if there exists a function h : L(A) → A for
which
g(π) =
∑
σ∈L(A)
πσeh(σ).
2. Duple: g is a duple rule if |{a | ∃π such that g(π)a 6= 0}| ≤ 2.
Examples of strategyproof randomized voting rules include randomized positional scoring rules and the
randomized Copeland rule, which were previously studied in this context Conitzer and Sandholm [2006],
Procaccia [2010]. In particular, a randomized positional scoring rule with score vector s is a distribution
with probabilities proportional to s1, . . . , sm over unilateral rules g1, . . . , gm, where each gi corresponds to
the function hi(σ) that returns the alternative ranked at position i of σ. Similarly, the randomized Copeland
rule is a uniform distribution over duples ga,b for any two different a, b ∈ A, where ga,b(π) = ea if a>pi b,
ga,b(π) = eb if b>pi a, and (ga,b(π))a = (ga,b(π))b = 1/2 if a =pi b.
3The theorem also requires a range of size at least 3.
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2.2 Online Learning
We next describe the general setting of online learning, also known as learning from experts. We consider a
game between a learner and an adversary. There is a set of actions (a.k.a experts) X available to the learner,
a set of actions Y available to the adversary, and a loss function f : X × Y → [0, 1] that is known to both
parties. In every time step t ∈ [T ], the learner chooses a distribution, denoted by a vector pt ∈ ∆(X ),
over the actions in X , and the adversary chooses an action yt from the set Y . The learner then receives a
loss of f(xt, yt) for xt ∼ pt. At this point, the learner receives some feedback regarding the action of the
adversary. In the full information setting, the learner observes yt before proceeding to the next time step. In
the partial information setting, the learner only observes the loss f(xt, yt).
The regret of the algorithm is defined as the difference between its total expected loss and that of the
best fixed action in hindsight. The goal of the learner is to minimize its expected regret, that is, minimize
E[RegT ] , E
[
T∑
t=1
f(xt, yt)−min
x∈X
T∑
t=1
f(x, yt)
]
,
where the expectation is taken over the choice of xt ∼ pt, and any other random choices made by the
algorithm and the adversary. An online algorithm is called a no-regret algorithm if E[RegT ] ∈ o(T ). In
words, the average regret of the learner must go to 0 as T → ∞. In general, deterministic algorithms,
for which ‖pt‖∞ = 1, can suffer linear regret, because the adversary can choose a sequence of actions
y1, . . . , yT on which the algorithm makes sub-optimal decisions at every round. Therefore, randomization
is one of the key aspects of no-regret algorithms.
Many online no-regret algorithms are known for the full information and the partial information set-
tings. In particular, the HEDGE algorithm Freund and Schapire [1995] is one of the earliest results in
this space for the full information setting. At time t + 1, HEDGE picks each action x with probability
pt+1x ∝ exp(−ηF t(x)), for F t(x) =
∑t
s=1 f(x, y
s) and η = Θ
(√
2 ln(|X |) /T
)
.
Proposition 2.2 (Freund and Schapire [1995]). HEDGE has regret E[RegT ] ≤ O
(√
T ln(|X |)
)
.
For the partial information setting, the EXP3 algorithm of Auer et al. [2002] can be thought of as a
variant of the HEDGE algorithm with importance weighting. In particular, at time t + 1, EXP3 picks each
action x with probability pt+1x ∝ exp
(
−ηF˜ t(x)
)
, for η = Θ
(√
2 ln(|X |) /T |X |
)
and
F˜ t(x) =
t∑
s=1
1(xs=x)f(x, y
s)
psx
. (1)
In other words, EXP3 is is similar to HEDGE, except that instead of taking into account the total loss of an
action, F t(x), it takes into account an estimate of the loss, F˜ t(x).
Proposition 2.3 (Auer et al. [2002]). EXP3 has regret E[RegT ] ≤ O
(√
T |X | ln(|X |)
)
.
3 Problem Formulation
In this section, we formulate the question of how one can design a weighting scheme that effectively weights
the rankings of voters based on the history of their votes and the performance of the selected alternatives.
We consider a setting where n voters participate in a sequence of elections that are decided by a known
voting rule f . In each election, voters submit their rankings over a different set of m alternatives so as to
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elect a winner. Given an adversarial sequence of voters’ rankings σ1:T and alternative losses ℓ1:T over a
span of T elections, the best voter is the one whose rankings lead to the election of the winners with smallest
loss overall. We call this voter the best voter in hindsight. When such a voter is known a priori, the weighting
scheme would do well to follow the rankings of this voter throughout the sequence of elections. In this case,
the overall expected loss of the alternatives chosen under this weighting scheme is
min
i∈[n]
T∑
t=1
Lf (πσt,ei , ℓ
t). (2)
However, when the sequence of elections is not known a priori, the best voter is not known either. In
this case, the weighting scheme has to take an online approach to weighting the voters’ rankings. That is, at
each time step t ≤ T , the weighting scheme chooses a weight vector wt, possibly at random, to weight the
rankings of the voters. After the election is held, the weighting scheme receives some feedback regarding
the quality of the alternatives in that election, typically in the form of the loss of the elected alternative or
that of all alternatives. Using the feedback, the weighting scheme then re-weights the voters’ rankings based
on their performance so far. In this case, the total expected loss of the weighting scheme is
T∑
t=1
Lf (πσt,wt , ℓ
t).
The type of the feedback is an important factor in designing a weighting scheme. Analogously to the
online learning models described in Section 2.2, we consider two types of feedback, full information and
partial information. In the full information case, after a winner is selected at time t, the quality of all
alternatives and rankings of the voters at that round are revealed to the weighting scheme. Note that this
information is sufficient for computing the loss of each voter’s rankings so far. On the other hand, in the
partial information setting only the loss of the winner is revealed. More formally, in the full information
setting the choice of wt+1 can depend on σ1:t and ℓ1:t, while in the partial information setting it can only
depend on σ1:t and ℓsas for s ≤ t, where as is the alternative that won the election at time s.
Our goal is to design a weighting scheme that weights the rankings of the voters at each time step, and
elects winners with overall expected loss that is almost as small as that of the best voter. We refer to the
expected difference between these losses as the expected regret. That is,
E[RegT ] , E
[
T∑
t=1
Lf (πσt,wt , ℓ
t)−min
i
T∑
t=1
Lf (πσt,ei , ℓ
t)
]
,
where the expectation is taken over any additional source of randomness in the adversarial sequence or the
algorithm. In particular, we seek a weighting scheme for which the average expected regret goes to zero as
the time horizon T goes to infinity, at a rate that is polynomial in the number of voters and alternatives. That
is, we wish to achieve E[RegT ] = poly(n,m) · o(T ). This is our version of a no-regret algorithm.
No doubt the reader has noted that the above problem formulation is closely related to the general setting
of online learning. Using the language of online learning introduced in Section 2.2, the weight vector wt
corresponds to the learner’s action xt, the vote profile and alternative losses (σt, ℓt) correspond to the
adversary’s action yt, the expected loss of the weighting scheme Lf (πσt,wt , ℓ
t) corresponds to the loss
of the learning algorithm f(xt, yt), and the best-in-hindsight voter — or weight vector ei — refers to the
best-in-hindsight action.
4 Randomized Weights
In this section, we develop no-regret algorithms for the full information and partial information settings.
We essentially require no assumptions on the voting rule, but also impose no restrictions on the weighting
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scheme. In particular, the weighting scheme may be randomized, that is, the weights can be sampled from a
distribution over weight vectors. This allows us to obtain general positive results.
As we just discussed, our setting is closely related to the classic online learning setting. Here, we
introduce an algorithm analogous to HEDGE that works in the full information setting of Section 3 and
achieves a total regret of O(
√
T ln(n)).
ALGORITHM 1: Full information setting, using randomized weights.
Input: Adversarial sequences σ1:T and ℓ1:T , and parameter η =
√
2 lnn/T
for t = 1, . . . , T do
Play weight vector ei with probability
pti ∝ exp
(
−η
t−1∑
s=1
Lf(πσs,ei , ℓ
s)
)
.
Observe ℓt and σt.
end
Theorem 4.1. For any anonymous voting rule f and n voters, Algorithm 1 has regret O(
√
T ln(n)) in the
full information setting.
Proof Sketch. At a high level, this algorithm only considers weight vectors that correspond to a single voter.
At every time step, the algorithm chooses a distribution over such weight vectors and applies the voting rule
to one such weight vector that is drawn at random from this distribution. This is equivalent to applying the
HEDGE algorithm to a set of actions, each of which is a weight vector that corresponds to a single voter.
That is,
E
[
T∑
t=1
Lf (πσt,wt , ℓ
t)
]
= Eit∼pt
[
T∑
t=1
Lf (πσt,eit , ℓ
t)
]
.
The theorem follows by noting that the loss of the benchmark weighting scheme (See Equation 2) is the
smallest loss that one can get from following one such weight vector. That is, by Proposition 2.2, the total
expected regret is
E
[
T∑
t=1
Lf (πσt,wt , ℓ
t)
]
−min
i
T∑
t=1
Lf (πσt,ei , ℓ
t) ≤ O
(√
T ln(n)
)
.
Next, we introduce an algorithm for the partial information setting. One may wonder whether the above
approach, i.e., reducing our problem to online learning and using a standard algorithm, directly extends to
the partial information setting (with the EXP3 algorithm). The answer is that it does not. In particular, in the
classic setting of online learning with partial information feedback, the algorithm observes the action of the
adversary and therefore can compute the estimated loss of the action it just played. That is, the algorithm can
compute f(xt, yt). In our problem setting, however, the weighting scheme only observes σt and ℓt
at
for the
specific alternative at that was elected at this time. Since the losses of other alternatives remain unknown,
the weighting scheme cannot even compute the expected loss of the specific voter it it selected at time t,
i.e., Lf (πσt,eit , ℓ
t). Therefore, we cannot directly use the EXP3 algorithm by imagining that the voters are
actions, as we do not obtain the partial information feedback that the algorithm requires.
Nevertheless, the algorithm we introduce here is inspired by EXP3. Fortunately, certain properties that
the performance of EXP3 relies on still hold in our setting. In particular, EXP3 uses f(xt, yt) to create an
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unbiased estimator of the true loss of action xt over t time steps. As we show, Algorithm 2 also creates an
unbiased estimator of the loss of voters in t time steps, using ℓat .
ALGORITHM 2: Partial information setting, using randomized weights.
Input: An adversarial sequences of σ1:T and ℓ1:T , and parameter η =
√
2 lnn/Tn.
Let L˜
0
= 0.
for t = 1, . . . , T do
for i = 1, . . . , n do
Let
pti ∝ exp(−ηL˜t−1i ).
end
Play weight vector eit from distribution p
t.
Observe the vote profile σt, the alternative at ∼ f(π
σ
t,e
it
), and its loss ℓtat .
Let ℓ˜
t
be the vector such that
ℓ˜tit =
ℓtat
pt
it
and ℓ˜ti = 0 for i 6= it.
Let L˜
t
= L˜
t−1
+ ℓ˜
t
.
end
Theorem 4.2. For any anonymous voting rule f and n voters, Algorithm 2 has regret O(
√
Tn ln(n)) in the
partial information setting.
Let us first establish a few crucial properties of Algorithm 2 in preparation for proving Theorem 4.2. In
the next lemma, we show that ℓ˜
t
creates an unbiased estimator of the expected loss of the weighting scheme.
Similarly, we show that for any voter i∗, L˜ti∗ is an unbiased estimator for the loss that the weighting scheme
would have received if it followed the rankings of voter i∗ throughout the sequence of elections.
Lemma 4.3. For any t and any i∗ we have
Eit,at
[
n∑
i=1
pti ℓ˜
t
i
]
= Eit
[
Lf (πσt,eit , ℓ
t)
]
and Eit,at
[
L˜Ti∗
]
=
T∑
t=1
Lf (πσt,ei∗ , ℓ
t),
where it ∼ pt and at ∼ f(π
σ
t,eit
).
Proof. For ease of notation, we suppress t when it is clear from the context. First note that ℓ˜ is zero in all of
its elements, except for ℓ˜it . So,
n∑
i=1
piℓ˜i = pit ℓ˜it = pit
ℓat
pit
= ℓat .
Therefore, we have
Eit,at
[
n∑
i=1
piℓ˜i
]
= Eit,at [ℓat ] = Eit
[
Lf (πσ,eit , ℓ)
]
.
For clarity of presentation, let ℓ˜
i,a
be an alternative representation of ℓ˜ when it = i and at = a. Note that
ℓi,ai∗ 6= 0 only if i∗ = i. We have
Eit,at
[
L˜Ti∗
]
=
T∑
t=1
Eit,at
[
ℓ˜i
t,at
i∗
]
=
T∑
t=1
n∑
i=1
pti Ea∼f(pi
σ
t,ei
)
[
ℓ˜i,ai∗
]
=
T∑
t=1
pti∗ Ea∼f(pi
σ
t,ei∗
)
[
ℓta
pti∗
]
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=T∑
t=1
Ea∼f(pi
σ
t,ei∗
)
[
ℓta
]
=
T∑
t=1
Lf (πσt,ei∗ , ℓ
t).
Lemma 4.4. For any t, we have
Eit,at
[
n∑
i=1
pti(ℓ˜
t
i)
2
]
≤ n,
where it ∼ pt and at ∼ f(π
σ
t,eit
).
Proof. For ease of notation, we suppress t when it is clear from the context. Since ℓ˜ is zero in all of its
elements, except for ℓ˜it , we have
n∑
i=1
pi(ℓ˜i)
2 = pit(ℓ˜it)
2 = pit
(
ℓat
pit
)2
=
(ℓat)
2
pit
.
Therefore,
Eit,at
[
n∑
i=1
pi(ℓ˜i)
2
]
= Eit,at
[
(ℓat)
2
pit
]
=
n∑
i=1
pi Ea∼f(piσ,ei)
[
(ℓa)
2
pi
]
=
n∑
i=1
Ea∼f(piσ,ei )
[
(ℓa)
2
] ≤ n.
Proof of Theorem 4.2. We use a potential function, given by Φt , − 1
η
ln
(∑n
i=1 exp(−ηL˜t−1i )
)
.We prove
the claim by analyzing the expected increase in this potential function at every time step. Note that
Φt+1 − Φt = −1
η
ln
(∑n
i=1 exp(−ηL˜t−1i − ηℓ˜ti)∑n
i=1 exp(−ηL˜t−1i )
)
= −1
η
ln
(
n∑
i=1
pti exp(−ηℓ˜ti)
)
. (3)
Taking the expected increase in the potential function over the random choices of it and at for all t =
1, . . . , T , we have
E [ΦT+1 − Φ1] =
T∑
t=1
Eit,at [Φt+1 − Φt]
≥
T∑
t=1
Eit,at
[
−1
η
ln
(
n∑
i=1
pti
(
1− ηℓ˜ti +
1
2
(
ηℓ˜ti
)2))]
=
T∑
t=1
Eit,at
[
−1
η
ln
(
1− η
(
n∑
i=1
ptiℓ˜
t
i −
η
2
n∑
i=1
pti
(
ℓ˜ti
)2))]
≥
T∑
t=1
Eit,at
[
n∑
i=1
ptiℓ˜
t
i −
η
2
n∑
i=1
pti
(
ℓ˜ti
)2]
≥ E
[
T∑
t=1
Lf (πσt,eit , ℓ
t)
]
− ηTn
2
, (4)
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where the second transition follows from Equation (3) because for all x ≥ 0, e−x ≤ 1− x+ x22 , the fourth
transition follows from ln(1− x) ≤ −x for all x ∈ R, and the last transition holds by Lemmas 4.3 and 4.4.
On the other hand, Φ1 = − 1η lnn and for any i∗,
ΦT+1 ≤ −1
η
ln
(
exp(−ηL˜Ti∗)
)
= L˜Ti∗ .
Therefore,
E [ΦT+1 − Φ1] ≤ E
[
L˜Ti∗ +
1
η
lnn
]
= E
[
T∑
t=1
Lf (πσt,ei∗ , ℓ
t) +
1
η
lnn
]
. (5)
We can now prove the theorem by using Equations (4) and (5), and the parameter value η =
√
2 lnn/Tn:
E
[
T∑
t=1
Lf (πσt,eit , ℓ
t)−min
i∈[n]
T∑
t=1
Lf (πσt,ei , ℓ
t)
]
≤ 1
η
lnn+
ηTn
2
≤
√
2Tn lnn.
5 Deterministic Weights
One of the key aspects of the weighting schemes we used in the previous section is randomization. In such
weighting schemes, the weights of the voters not only depend on their performance so far, but also on the
algorithm’s coin flips. In practice, voters would most likely prefer weighting schemes that depend only on
their past performance, and are therefore easier to interpret.
In this section, we focus on designing weighting schemes that are deterministic in nature. Formally, a
deterministic weighting scheme is an algorithm that at time step t+ 1 deterministically chooses one weight
vector wt+1 based on the history of play, i.e., sequences σ1:t, ℓ1:t, and a1:t. In this section, we seek an
answer to the following question: “For which voting rules is there a no-regret deterministic weighting
scheme?” In contrast to the results established in the previous section, we find that the properties of the vot-
ing rule play an important role here. In the remainder of this section, we show possibility and impossibility
results for the existence of such weighting schemes under randomized and deterministic voting rules.
5.1 Deterministic Voting Rules
We begin our search for deterministic weighting schemes by considering deterministic voting rules. Note
that in this case the winning alternatives are induced deterministically by the weighting scheme, so the
weight vector wt+1 should be deterministically chosen based on the sequences σ1:t and ℓ1:t. We establish
an impossibility result: Essentially no deterministic weighting scheme is no-regret for a deterministic voting
rule. Specifically, we show that a deterministic no-regret weighting scheme exists for a deterministic voting
rule if and only if the voting rule is constant on unanimous profiles.
Definition 5.1. A voting rule f is constant on unanimous profiles if and only if
∀σ, σ′ ∈ L(A), f(eσ) = f(eσ′),
where eσ denotes the anonymous vote profile that has all of its weight on ranking σ.
Theorem 5.2. For any deterministic voting rule f , a deterministic weighting scheme with regret o(T ) exists
if and only if f is constant on unanimous profiles. This is true in both the full information and partial
information settings.
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Proof. We first prove that for any voting rule that is constant on unanimous profiles there exists a determin-
istic weighting scheme that is no-regret. Consider such a voting rule f and a simple deterministic weighting
scheme that uses weight vector wt = e1 for every time step t ≤ T (so it does not use feedback — whether
full or partial — at all). Note that at each time step t and for any voter i ∈ [n],
f(π
σ
t,wt) = f(eσt1) = f(eσti ) = f(πσt,ei),
where the second transition holds because f is constant on unanimous profiles. As a result, Lf (πσt,wt , ℓ
t) =
Lf (πσt,ei , ℓ
t). In words, the total loss of the weighting scheme is the same as the total loss of any individual
voter — this weighting scheme has 0 regret.
Next, we prove that if f is not constant on unanimous profiles then for any deterministic weighting
scheme there is an adversarial sequence of σ1:T and ℓ1:T that leads to regret of Ω(T ), even in the full
information setting. Take any such voting rule f and let τ, τ ′ ∈ L(A) be such that f(eτ ) 6= f(eτ ′). At time
t, the adversary chooses σt and ℓt based on the deterministic weight vector wt as follows: The adversary
sets σt to be such that σt1 = τ and σ
t
j = τ
′ for all j 6= 1. Let alternative at be the winner of profile π
σ
t,wt ,
i.e., f(π
σ
t,wt) = eat . The adversary sets ℓ
t
at
= 1 and ℓtx = 0 for all x 6= at. Therefore, the weighting
scheme incurs a loss of 1 at every step, and its total loss is
T∑
t=1
Lf (πσt,wt , ℓ
t) =
T∑
t=1
ℓtat = T.
Let us consider the total loss that the ranking of any individual voter incurs. By design, for any j > 1,
f(π
σ
t,e1) = f(eτ ) 6= f(eτ ′) = f(πσt,ej ).
Therefore, for at least one voter i ∈ [n], f(π
σ
t,ei) 6= eat . Note that such a voter receives loss of 0, so the
combined loss of all voters is at most n − 1. Over all time steps, the total combined loss of all voters is at
most T (n− 1). As a result, the best voter incurs a loss of at most (n−1)T
n
, i.e., the average loss.
We conclude that the regret of the weighting scheme is
RegT =
T∑
t=1
Lf (πσt,wt , ℓ
t)−min
i∈[n]
T∑
t=1
Lf (πσt,ei , ℓ
t) ≥ T − (n− 1)T
n
=
T
n
.
5.2 Randomized Voting Rules
Theorem 5.2 indicates that we need to allow randomness (either in the weighting scheme or in the voting
rule) if we wish to have no-regret guarantees. As stated before, we would like to have a deterministic
weighting scheme so that the weights of voters are not decided by coin flips. This leaves us with no choice
other than having a randomized voting rule. Nonetheless, one might argue in favor of having a deterministic
voting rule and a randomized weighting scheme, claiming that it is equivalent because the randomness has
simply been shifted from the voting rule to the weights. To that imaginary critic we say that allowing the
voting rule to be randomized makes it possible to achieve strategyproofness (see Section 2.1), which cannot
be satisfied by a deterministic voting rule.
The next theorem shows that for any voting rule that is a distribution over unilaterals there exist deter-
ministic weighting schemes that are no-regret. Recall that any randomized positional scoring rule can be
represented as a distribution over unilaterals, hence the theorem allows us to design a no-regret weighting
scheme for any randomized positional scoring rule.
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The weighting schemes that we use build on Algorithms 1 and 2 directly. In more detail, we consider
deterministic weighting schemes that at time t use weight vector pt and a randomly drawn candidate at ∼
f(π
σ
t,pt), where p
t is computed according to Algorithms 1 or 2. The key insight behind these weighting
schemes is that, as we will show, if f is a distribution over unilaterals, we have
Ei∼pt [f(πσt,ei)] = f(πσt,pt), (6)
where the left-hand side is a vector of expectations. That is, the outcome of the voting rule f(π
σ
t,pt) can
be alternatively implemented by applying the voting rule on the ranking of voter i that is drawn at random
from the distribution pt. This is exactly what Algorithms 1 and 2 do. Therefore, the deterministic weighting
schemes induce the same distribution over alternatives at every time step as their randomized counterparts,
and achieve the same regret.
Theorem 5.3. For any voting rule that is a distribution over unilaterals, there exist deterministic weighting
schemes with regret of O(
√
T ln(n)) and O(
√
Tn ln(n)) in the full-information and partial-information
settings, respectively.
Proof. Let f be a distribution over unilaterals g1, . . . , gk with corresponding probabilities q1, . . . , qk. Also,
let hj : L(A) → A denote the function corresponding to gj , for j ∈ [k]. We first prove Equation (6).
For ease of exposition we suppress t in the notations, when it is clear from the context. Furthermore, let
π
i = π
σ
t,ei . It holds that
Ei∼pt
[
f(π
σ
t,ei)
]
=
n∑
i=1
ptif(π
i) =
n∑
i=1
pti
k∑
j=1
qj
∑
τ∈L(A)
πiτehj(τ) =
n∑
i=1
pti
k∑
j=1
qjehj(σi),
where the last equality follows by the fact that πiσi = 1 and π
i
τ = 0 for any τ 6= σi. Moreover, let
π = π
σ
t,pt , then
f(π
σ
t,pt) =
k∑
j=1
qj
∑
τ∈L(A)
πτehj(τ) =
k∑
j=1
qj
∑
τ∈L(A)
ehj(τ)
n∑
i=1
pti1(σi=τ) =
n∑
i=1
pti
k∑
j=1
qjehj(σi).
Now that we have established Equation (6), we use it to conclude that
T∑
t=1
Lf (πσt,pt , ℓ
t)−min
i∈[n]
T∑
t=1
Lf (πσt,ei , ℓ
t) = E
[
T∑
t=1
Lf (πσt,ei , ℓ
t)−min
i∈[n]
T∑
t=1
Lf (πσt,ei , ℓ
t)
]
,
where the expectation is taken over choice of i ∼ pt for all t. Therefore, the deterministic weighting
schemes that use weight vector pt achieve the same regret bounds as those established in Theorems 4.1 and
4.2.
We have seen that there exist no-regret deterministic weighting schemes for any voting rule that is a
distribution over unilaterals. It is natural to ask whether being a distribution over unilaterals is, in some
sense, also a necessary condition. While we do not give a complete answer to this question, we are able to
identify a sufficient condition for not having no-regret deterministic weighting schemes.
Recall the definitions of Condorcet winner and Condorcet consistency, introduced in Section 2.1. Here
we extend the notion of Condorcet consistency to randomized rules.
Definition 5.4. For a set of alternatives A such that |A| = m, a randomized voting rule f : ∆(L(A)) →
∆(A) is probabilistically Condorcet consistent with gap δ(m) if for any anonymous vote profile π that has
a Condorcet winner a, and for all alternatives x ∈ A \ {a},
f(π)a ≥ f(π)x + δ(m).
13
In words, a randomized voting rule is probabilistically Condorcet consistent if the Condorcet winner has
strictly higher probability of being selected than any other alternative, by a gap of δ(m). As an example, the
randomized Copeland rule is probabilistically Condorcet consistent with δ(m) = Ω(1/m2). To see why,
note that for any vote profile π, ∑
a∈A
C-scorepi(a) =
(
m
2
)
,
a Condorcet winner b has C-scorepi(b) = m − 1, and any other alternative has score at most m − 2.
Therefore, b has probability 2/m, and any other alternative has probability at most 2(m−2)
m(m−1) . Hence, we
have a gap of 2
m(m−1) for the randomized Copeland rule. Also note that any deterministic voting rule that is
(probabilistically) Condorcet consistent has a gap of δ(m) = 1.
Theorem 5.5. For a set of alternatives A such that |A| = m, let f be a probabilistically Condorcet consis-
tent voting rule with gap δ(m), and suppose there are n voters for n ≥ 2
(
3
2δ(m) + 1
)
. Then any determin-
istic weighting scheme will suffer regret of Ω(T ) under f (in the worst case), even in the full information
setting.
We will require the following trivial lemma.
Lemma 5.6. Let x1, x2, · · · xn be n real numbers such that xi ≥ xi+1 for all i ∈ [n − 1], and denote
S =
∑n
i=1 xi. Then for any j ∈ [n],
∑j
i=1 xi ≥ j Sn .
Proof. Assume for the sake of contradiction that there exists j ∈ [n−1] such that∑ji=1 xi < j Sn . It follows
that there is i ∈ [j] such that xi < Sn . In addition, it must be the case that
∑n
i=j+1 xi > (n − j)Sn , which
implies that there is i′ ∈ {j + 1, . . . , n} such that xi′ > Sn . This contradicts the fact that xi ≥ xi′ .
Proof of Theorem 5.5. Fix an arbitrary deterministic weighting scheme. We will show that the loss of this
weighting scheme is strictly higher than the average loss of the voters (for appropriately chosen vote profiles
and loss functions) at every time step t, which directly leads to linear regret.
Consider an arbitrary time step t ≤ T , and let wt denote the weights chosen by the weighting scheme.
To construct the vote profile σt, the adversary first partitions the voters into two sets N t1 and N
t
2, as follows:
It sorts the weights wt in non-increasing order, and then it adds voters to N t1 by their sorted weight (largest
to smallest) until
W t1 ,
∑
i∈Nt1
wti >
1
2
‖wt‖1,
that is, until the voters in N t1 have more than half the total weight. The remaining voters form set N
t
2.
Now, let τx,y ∈ L(A) denote a ranking that places x at the top (i.e., τx,y(x) = 1) and y in second place
(i.e., τx,y(y) = 2). Let a and b be two alternatives such that f(eτb,a)b − f(eτb,a)a ≥ f(eτa,b)a − f(eτa,b)b,
i.e., the gap between the probabilities of picking the top two alternatives in eτb,a is at least the corresponding
gap in eτa,b . The adversary sets the vote profile σ
t such that σti = τ
a,b for all i ∈ N t1 and σti = τ b,a for all
i ∈ N t2. Also, it sets the loss function ℓt to be ℓta = 1, ℓtb = 0, and ℓtx = 1/2 for all x ∈ A \ {a, b}.
Observe that for all i ∈ N t1, a ≻σi x for all x ∈ A \ {a}. Since the total weight of voters in N t1 is more
than 1/2, a is a Condorcet winner in π
σ
t,wt . Therefore, because f is probabilistically Condorcet consistent
with gap δ(m), it holds that
f(π
σ
t,wt)a ≥ f(πσt,wt)b + δ(m).
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It follows that the loss of the weighting scheme is
Lf (πσt,wt , ℓ
t) = 1 · f(π
σ
t,wt)a +
1
2
· (1− f(π
σ
t,wt)a − f(πσt,wt)b
)
=
1
2
+
1
2
(
f(π
σ
t,wt)a − f(πσt,wt)b
)
≥ 1
2
+
1
2
δ(m).
(7)
Similarly, the loss of voter i is
Lf (πσt,ei , ℓ
t) = Lf (eσti , ℓ
t) =
1
2
+
1
2
(
f(eσti )a − f(eσti )b
)
. (8)
Let q1 denote f(eτa,b), i.e. the distribution over the alternatives for the votes of voters in N
t
1, and let q
2
denote f(eτb,a), i.e. the distribution over the alternatives for the votes of voters inN
t
2. Using these notations
and Equation (8), the loss of a voter i ∈ N t1 is
Lf (πσt,ei , ℓ
t) =
1
2
+
1
2
(
q1a − q1b
)
,
and the loss of a voter i ∈ N t2 is
Lf (πσt,ei , ℓ
t) =
1
2
+
1
2
(
q2a − q2b
)
=
1
2
− 1
2
(q2b − q2a).
Hence, the average loss over all voters is
Ltavg =
|N t1|
(
1
2 +
1
2
(
q1a − q1b
))
+ (n− |N t1|)
(
1
2 − 12(q2b − q2a)
)
n
=
1
2
+
1
2n
(|N t1|(q1a − q1b )− (n − |N t1|)(q2b − q2a)) .
But we chose a and b such that q1a − q1b ≤ q2b − q2a. We conclude that
Ltavg ≤
1
2
+
1
2n
(|N t1|(q2b − q2a)− (n− |N t1|)(q2b − q2a))
=
1
2
+
1
2
(q2b − q2a)
(2|N t1| − n)
n
.
(9)
Our goal is to derive an upper bound on the expression 12(q
2
b − q2a) (2|N
t
1|−n)
n
. Specifically, we wish to
prove that
1
2
(q2b − q2a)
(2|N t1| − n)
n
≤ δ(m)
3
. (10)
We do this by examining two cases.
Case 1: W t1 ≥
(
1
2 +
δ(m)
3
)
‖wt‖1. Informally, this is the case when the weights of N t1 overshot ‖wt‖1/2
by a fraction of at least δ(m)/3. This means that the last voter added to N t1 has a weight of at least W
t
1 −
‖wt‖1
2 . Since the weights were added in non-increasing order, it follows that each voter in N
t
1 has a weight
of at leastW t1 − ‖w
t‖1
2 . Therefore,
W t1 =
∑
i∈Nt1
wti ≥
∑
i∈Nt1
(
W t1 −
‖wt‖1
2
)
= |N t1|
(
W t1 −
‖wt‖1
2
)
,
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or equivalently,
|N t1| ≤
1
1− ‖wt‖1
2W t1
. (11)
We have also assumed that
W t1
‖wt‖1
≥
(
1
2 +
δ(m)
3
)
. Using Equation (11), we obtain
|N t1| ≤
1
1− 1
1+
2δ(m)
3
=
3
2δ(m)
+ 1. (12)
Let us now examine the expression on the left-hand side of Equation (10). Note that b is a Condorcet
winner in eτb,a . Hence, q
2
b ≥ q2a + δ(m), and, in particular, q2b − q2a > 0. In addition, we have assumed that
n ≥ 2( 32δ(m) + 1), which implies (by Equation (12)) that n ≥ 2|N t1|. It follows that
1
2
(q2b − q2a)
(2|N t1| − n)
n
≤ 0 ≤ δ(m)
3
,
thereby establishing Equation (10) for this case.
Case 2: W t1 <
(
1
2 +
δ(m)
3
)
‖wt‖1 SinceN t1 contains voters who have the largest |N t1|weights, Lemma 5.6
implies that
W t1 =
∑
i∈Nt1
wti ≥ |N t1|
‖wt‖1
n
.
We have also assumed thatW t1 < (
1
2 +
δ(m)
3 )‖wt‖1. Combining the last two inequalities, we obtain
|N t1| < n
(
1
2
+
δ(m)
3
)
. (13)
Let us examine, once again, the left-hand side of Equation (10). Recall that q2b − q2a > 0, because b is
a Condorcet winner in τ b,a. So, if 2|N t1| − n ≤ 0, then Equation (10) clearly holds, as in Case 1. And if
2|N t1| − n > 0, the equation also holds, because
1
2
(q2b − q2a)
(2|N t1| − n)
n
≤ 1
2
· 1 · (2|N
t
1| − n)
n
=
|N t1|
n
− 1
2
<
δ(m)
3
,
where the last inequality follows from Equation (13).
To complete the proof, we combine Equations (7), (9), and (10), to obtain
Lf (πσt,wt , ℓ
t) ≥ Ltavg +
δ(m)
6
.
The best voter in hindsight incurs loss that is at most as high as the average voter. Therefore, the overall
regret is
RegT =
T∑
t=1
Lf (πσt,wt , ℓ
t)−min
i
T∑
t=1
Lf (πσt,ei , ℓ
t)
≥
T∑
t=1
Lf (πσt,wt , ℓ
t)−
T∑
t=1
Ltavg
≥ T δ(m)
6
.
In words, the weighting scheme suffers linear regret.
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It is interesting to note that Theorems 5.2 and 5.5 together imply that distributions over unilaterals are
not probabilistically Condorcet consistent. This is actually quite intuitive: Distributions over unilaterals are
“local” in that they look at each voter separately, whereas Condorcet consistency is a global property. In
fact, these theorems can be used to prove — in an especially convoluted and indirect way — a simple result
from social choice theory Moulin [1983]: No positional scoring rule is Condorcet consistent!
6 Discussion
We conclude by discussing several conceptual points.
Changing the sets of alternatives and voters over time We wish to emphasize that the set of alternatives
at each time step, i.e., in each election, can be completely different. Moreover, the number of alternatives
could be different. In fact, our positive results do not even depend on the number of alternatives m, so we
can simply set m to be an upper bound. By contrast, we do need the set of voters to stay fixed throughout
the process, but this is consistent with our motivating examples (e.g., a group of partners in a small venture
capital firm would face different choices at every time step, but the composition of the group rarely changes).
Optimizing the voting rule Throughout the paper, the voting rule is exogenous. One might ask whether
it makes sense to optimize the choice of voting rule itself, in order to obtain good no-regret learning results.
Our answer is “yes and no”. On the one hand, we believe our results do give some guidance on choosing
between voting rules. For example, from this viewpoint, one might prefer randomized Borda (which admits
no-regret algorithms under a deterministic weighting scheme) to randomized Copeland (which does not).
On the other hand, many considerations are factored into the choice of voting rule: social choice axioms,
optimization of additional objectives Procaccia et al. [2016], Boutilier et al. [2015], Elkind et al. [2009],
Conitzer and Sandholm [2005], and simplicity. It is therefore best to think of our approach as augmenting
voting rules that are already in place.
A natural, harder benchmark In our model (see Section 3), we are competing with the best voter in
hindsight. But our action space consists of weight vectors. It is therefore natural to ask whether we can
compete with the best weight vector in hindsight. Clearly this alternative benchmark is at least as hard,
because the best voter i∗ corresponds to the weight vector ei∗ . Informally, the alternative benchmark is
strictly harder if the voting rule does not nicely decompose across voters (like distributions over unilaterals
do). We can prove some positive results for the alternative benchmark under specific voting rules (such as
randomized Copeland) and specific families of weight vectors; but properly dealing with it largely remains
an open problem.
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